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 (i) 
 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Whether, under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, virtual contacts can establish specific 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
under the effects-based test of Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984), where the relevant online 
activity is equally accessible nationwide but its 
content focuses on the forum state and the tortfeasor 
has knowingly caused the plaintiff to suffer 
reputational and emotional harm in the forum state, a 
question left open by this Court’s decision in Walden 
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014). 
 
 
ii 
 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner was plaintiff in the Circuit Court of 
Jefferson County and appellee in the Supreme Court 
of Alabama.   
Respondent Facebook, Inc., was a defendant in 
the Jefferson County Circuit Court and appellant in 
the Supreme Court of Alabama.    
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS 
 The status of the other defendants in the same 
originating case (Jefferson County Circuit Court, No. 
C.V.17-255) is as follows: 
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next 
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child. v. Claudia 
D’Arcy, (default judgment entered December 
18, 2017). 
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next 
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Renee L. 
Gelin, (order denying motion to dismiss and 
granting preliminary injunction issued 
December 18, 2017; reversed and remanded 
with instructions by the Supreme Court of 
Alabama on June 28, 2019 (No. 1170294); 
pending settlement).    
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next 
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Kim 
McLeod, (order denying motion to dismiss and 
granting preliminary injunction issued 
December 18, 2017; reversed and remanded 
with instructions by the Supreme Court of 
Alabama on June 28, 2019 (No. 1170336); 
pending settlement).     
iii 
• K.G.S., individually, and as guardian and next 
friend of Baby Doe, a minor child v. Jennifer L. 
Wachowski, (default judgment entered on 
March 26, 2019).  
There are no additional proceedings in any court that 
are directly related to this case.  
iv 
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioner K.G.S. respectfully petitions for a writ 
of certiorari to review the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Alabama in this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama 
(Pet. App. 1a–52a) is slated to be published, __ So. 2d.  
__, and is currently available at 2019 Ala. LEXIS 63.   
That court’s order denying rehearing is unpublished. 
(Pet. App. 60a–61a).  The orders of the Circuit Court 
of Jefferson County granting a preliminary injunction 
(Pet. App. 55a–57a), denying Facebook’s motion to 
dismiss (Pet. App. 58a–59a), and dismissing K.G.S.’s 
claims against Facebook with prejudice after remand 
(Pet. App. 53a–54a) were issued without opinion and 
are unpublished.   
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Alabama issued its opinion 
on June 28, 2019. Rehearing was denied on August 23, 
2019. Justice Thomas, Circuit Justice for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, extended 
the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari to and 
including January 17, 2020. This Court’s jurisdiction 
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).   
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
PROVISIONS 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:  
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[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.  
Alabama’s long-arm rule, found in Alabama Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4.2, is reproduced at Pet. App. 62a–
65a.   
INTRODUCTION 
This case raises an important and recurring 
question expressly left open by this Court—under 
what circumstances can virtual conduct provide the 
requisite minimum contacts to allow a forum state to 
exercise specific jurisdiction, when the intentional 
torts providing the basis of the claim are “committed 
via the Internet or other electronic means.” Walden v. 
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014).  
This question is increasingly urgent. Today “the 
most important place[] (in a spatial sense) for the 
exchange of views … is clear. It is cyberspace — the 
vast democratic forums of the Internet in general, and 
social media in particular.” Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). And in 
commerce, “[b]etween targeted advertising and 
instant access to most consumers via any internet-
enabled device, a business may be present in a State 
in a meaningful way without that presence being 
physical in the traditional sense of the term.” South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
For good or for ill, many personal and business 
relationships now take place entirely online (servers 
aside). In doctrine after doctrine, this Court has 
grappled with the changes wrought by this digital 
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revolution, and the receding importance of physical 
presence or contacts—but not yet for personal 
jurisdiction. 
The time to answer the question left open in 
Walden is now. In the absence of clear guidance from 
this Court, some courts of appeals and state courts of 
last resort—like the Alabama Supreme Court here—
have unduly cabined the possibility of specific 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that 
operates predominantly online, and therefore 
everywhere. As alleged below, Facebook reviewed but 
refused to remove, and continued to disseminate, an 
Alabama-focused Facebook page—about Alabama 
residents,1 drawn from Alabama sources, containing 
articles that criticized Alabama law and videos filmed 
in Alabama—even after being put on notice that the 
content violated Alabama law (because it disclosed 
information specially shielded from disclosure by 
Alabama statute) and that it was being disseminated 
to Alabama users, and therefore causing harm to an 
Alabama resident within the state.  
Other than updating the medium from a 
nationwide print magazine mailed throughout the 
country (including a large number of subscribers in 
the forum state) to a page disseminated nationwide 
online (including a large number of users in the forum 
state), this case is no different than Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783 (1984). This Court’s pre-internet 
precedents involving specific jurisdiction over the 
intentional dissemination of harmful material should 
 
1 The parties in the contested adoption that gave rise to this 
case—the birth mother, K.G.S., and Baby Doe—are all Alabama 
residents.  
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thus have controlled, such that the purposeful 
exploitation of a local market (through targeted 
content) with knowledge that the brunt of the harm 
will be suffered in the forum (given extensive 
readership there) should have sufficed to establish 
specific jurisdiction.  
By holding that due process precluded 
jurisdiction here, the Alabama Supreme Court paid lip 
service to Calder, but effectively eviscerated it. 
Following other courts that have done the same, the 
Alabama Supreme Court misread Walden to 
effectively confine Calder and similar cases to their 
facts. Yet nothing in Walden purports to overrule 
those precedents. On the contrary, Walden expressly 
left open the question of whether and how those 
precedents apply in the modern world—specifically 
how a defendant’s virtual contacts with the forum 
state can establish minimum contacts consistent with 
the Due Process Clause. This case provides an 
opportunity for the Court to answer the question left 
open in Walden, and to provide much needed clarity to 
the lower courts.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1.  In the summer of 2015, K.G.S. filed a petition 
in Alabama to adopt Baby Doe, which was contested 
by the birth mother. Pet. App. 5a. The Alabama Court 
of Civil Appeals affirmed the adoption. See K.L.R. v. 
K.G.S., 264 So. 3d 65 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018); Pet. App. 
5a n.4.   
The birth mother then shared her version of 
events with Mirah Riben, “a well-known critic of the 
United States’ adoption system.” Pet. App. 5a. In July 
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2015, the Huffington Post published two online 
articles about the Alabama adoption authored by 
Riben which revealed confidential information, 
including the identities of the birth mother and 
K.G.S.—kept confidential in the adoption proceedings 
under Alabama law—and published photographs of 
Baby Doe. Pet. App. 5a. The articles described the 
birth mother’s signing of a pre-birth consent to the 
adoption, her change of heart after giving birth, and 
how her failure to legally withdraw the pre-birth 
consent allowed K.G.S. to adopt Baby Doe. Pet. App. 
5a–6a. The article also stated that pre-birth contracts 
such as the one signed by Baby Doe’s birth mother 
were legal in Alabama, but illegal in 48 other states.  
First Amended Complaint (FAC), Exhibit A, at 5, 
Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, at 336.2  
Working with the birth mother in an attempt to 
pressure K.G.S. to give up the legal adoption, Claudia 
D’Arcy (a New York resident) created a Facebook page 
to disseminate the articles and to establish a 
discussion forum for the issues they raised regarding 
the Alabama adoption and Alabama’s pre-birth 
consent rule. Pet. App. 67a, 70a–71a (FAC ¶¶ 6, 14, 
19). The page’s content was focused on the Baby Doe 
adoption. The page included photos of K.G.S., Baby 
Doe, and the adoption attorney, attached the articles, 
included K.G.S.’s full name, and revealed new details 
about the contested Alabama adoption, in violation of 
 
2 This case was originally filed under seal, but as the Alabama 
Supreme Court noted, Pet. App. 7a n.5, the case was later 
unsealed and marked “confidential.” No confidential material is 
revealed in this petition or its appendix. The Petition Appendix 
contains the operative complaint, but not its exhibits, which 
contain confidential material.   
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the Alabama adoption code. Pet. App. 50a n.18; Pet. 
App. 71a (FAC ¶¶ 20–21).  
The Facebook page was “persistently updated” 
with posts, news articles, and videos filmed in 
Jefferson County, Alabama. Pet. App. 72a (FAC ¶ 25). 
It was freely available to Alabama residents to access, 
Pet. App. 27a n.11, and was read by K.G.S.’s “business 
associates, friends, and certain family members.” Pet. 
App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32). Following the launch of the 
Facebook page, K.G.S. was “inundated with 
appallingly malicious and persistent cyber-bullying,” 
Pet. App. 6a, including “hateful messages from 
random individuals and organizations inside ... the 
State of Alabama via telephone, email, or regular 
mail.” Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 30). 
K.G.S.’s attorney notified Facebook in a July 
2015 letter that the Facebook page violated the 
confidentiality provisions of the Alabama Adoption 
Code, § 26-10A-1 et seq., demanding its removal. Pet. 
App. 6a. Facebook responded by removing the page’s 
“cover photo, but refused to delete the [Facebook] page 
or otherwise prevent it from disseminating its harmful 
and false message.” Id.   
2.  This action followed. K.G.S. filed her 
complaint in Jefferson County Circuit Court, 
Birmingham, Alabama, in July 2017, naming 
Facebook and various individual defendants involved 
in the creation, updating, and promotion of the 
Facebook page as defendants. Pet. App. 6a–8a. She 
alleged that “persistent[] updat[ing]” of the Facebook 
page “with various posts, news articles, and YouTube 
videos at K.G.S.’s expense,” had made her “the poster-
child for ‘predatory’ adoptions.” Id.    
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Claims against Facebook and the other 
defendants included negligence per se for violation of 
various confidentiality provisions of the Alabama 
Adoption Code and the Alabama common law torts of 
outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
conspiracy, negligence, and wantonness. Id. The harm 
alleged included reputational harm because K.G.S.’s 
business associates, friends and family members 
“view[ed] [her] in a different light,” as a result of 
viewing the Facebook page. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32). 
In addition, K.G.S. alleged she suffered emotional 
distress from the disclosure of private information and 
the hateful messages received from within (and 
without) Alabama. Pet. App. 73a–74a (FAC ¶¶ 31–33).  
In a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking 
immediate deactivation of the Facebook page, K.G.S. 
described threats made against her, including one that 
she be “drug through the streets of Birmingham.” 
Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, p. 309.   
Facebook moved to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of 
personal jurisdiction. An affidavit from a Facebook 
employee confirmed Facebook’s incorporation in 
Delaware and principal place of business in California, 
and stated that the Facebook web site and mobile 
application were “available for users to access 
anywhere in the country (or in the world)” where there 
is Internet access; “that individuals in all 50 states” 
have Facebook accounts; that Facebook “is qualified to 
do business” in all 50 states; and that Facebook “has 
no offices, property, or employees located in Alabama.”  
Pet. App. 8a–9a.  
Following a hearing, on December 18, 2017, the 
trial court denied Facebook’s motion to dismiss, Pet. 
App. 12a, and entered a preliminary injunction 
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against Facebook ordering deactivation of the page 
given Facebook’s role as the principal disseminator of 
confidential information and the irreparable injury to 
K.G.S. from the disclosure. Id.; see also Pet. App. 55a–
57a. 
3. Facebook appealed the grant of the 
preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court of 
Alabama arguing, as relevant here, that the trial court 
lacked personal jurisdiction and therefore had no 
authority to order deactivation of the page. Pet. App. 
13a. The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that 
the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction did not comport 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, voided the preliminary injunction, and 
instructed the trial court to dismiss all claims against 
Facebook. Pet. App. 16a–36a, 51a.3   
a. With respect to general jurisdiction—a 
holding that Petitioner does not request this Court to 
review—the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that 
Facebook was not “at home” in Alabama, because it 
was not incorporated there, did not maintain its 
principal place of business there, and K.G.S. presented 
 
3  The reviewing court recognized as “well settled” that 
Alabama’s long-arm rule, Rule 4.2 of the Alabama Rules of Civil 
Procedure (reproduced in full at Pet. App. 62a–65a) “extends the 
personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit[s] of due 
process under the United States and Alabama Constitutions.”  
Pet. App. 15a (quoting Hiller Invs., Inc. v. Insultech Grp., Inc., 
957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006)). Moreover, the “due process 
guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution is coextensive with 
the due process guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” 
Id. (citing Ex parte Int’l Creative Mgmt. Partners, LLC, 258 So. 
3d 1111, 1114–15 (Ala. 2018)).   
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no evidence to prove otherwise. Pet. App. 17a–21a; see 
also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 
(2014).   
b. Turning next to specific jurisdiction, the 
reviewing court relied on and quoted at length from 
this Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 
(2014), as guiding precedent. Pet. App. 22a–25a. The 
court observed that for specific jurisdiction, “the 
defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a 
substantial connection with the forum State.” Pet. 
App. 22a (quoting Walden, 571 U.S at 284). It focused 
especially on Walden’s teaching that the “plaintiff 
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the 
forum,” but “[r]ather, it is the defendant’s conduct that 
must form the necessary connection with the forum 
State” for the assertion of specific jurisdiction. Pet. 
App. 24a (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 277, 285). 
K.G.S. argued that Facebook intentionally aimed 
its conduct toward Alabama, causing harm to an 
Alabama citizen, and that its actions—including 
refusal to delete the page that “wholly pertained to an 
Alabama adoption,” after learning of the harm it 
caused K.G.S. within Alabama—satisfied the effects-
based test for specific jurisdiction that this Court set 
forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Pet. App. 
26a.  
The elements necessary for specific jurisdiction 
were satisfied, K.G.S. argued because, as alleged in 
the operative complaint, (1) Facebook committed an 
intentional tort (IIED or outrage); (2) Facebook’s 
intentional conduct was expressly aimed at Alabama, 
as the Facebook page was filled with Alabama content 
centered around Alabama residents, Alabama’s laws, 
and an Alabama adoption; (3) the brunt of the harm 
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caused by Facebook’s intentional conduct was suffered 
in Alabama, by an Alabama resident, including in her 
relationships with other Alabama residents who read 
and commented on the page; and (4) Facebook knew 
the harm from its intentional conduct was likely to be 
suffered in Alabama. Pet. App. 26a–27a; id. at 73a 
(FAC ¶ 32); Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, 322. 
Even though the general availability of the 
Facebook page—including its undisputed accessibility 
to users in Alabama—was a critical fact that precluded 
the exercise of general jurisdiction (because Facebook 
could not possibly be “at home” everywhere it was 
available, Pet. App. 20a n.9), the Alabama Supreme 
Court declined to consider “the general fact that the 
Facebook Web site and mobile application are 
available for users in Alabama to access,” for purposes 
of specific jurisdiction. Pet. App. 27a n.11. The court 
reasoned that the Alabama-focused page’s availability 
in Alabama was not pertinent to the specific 
jurisdiction analysis because it was not “suit-related 
conduct that was ‘purposefully directed’ to the forum.” 
Id.   
The reviewing court recited the facts in Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, at length and Walden’s discussion 
of that case, 571 U.S. at 286–90. Pet. App. 27a–33a. It 
then determined that this case was closer to Walden 
than to Calder. Pet. App. 30a, 33a–35a. But in so 
doing, Alabama’s highest court failed to consider 
Facebook’s virtual contacts with the forum state 
through the page itself, a question expressly left open 
in Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 n.9.   
The Alabama court thus concluded that 
Facebook’s “suit-related conduct” was limited to the 
interchanges with K.G.S. and her attorney and was 
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precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” insufficient to 
satisfy minimum contacts under Walden. Pet. App. 
35a. Without elaboration, the court stated that “to the 
extent that Facebook’s failure to act to remove the 
Facebook page can be analyzed separately from the 
responses it sent to K.G.S. and her attorney, we can 
only conclude that this intentional conduct was 
expressly aimed at K.G.S. herself, and not at Alabama 
as a forum.” Pet. App. 35a. 
Disregarding the jurisdictional elephant in the 
room—Facebook’s virtual contacts with Alabama 
residents by allowing the Alabama-focused page to 
continue to be accessed in Alabama (and the resulting 
reputational harm caused to K.G.S.)—the court 
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
allow for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over 
Facebook, Pet. App. 36a, voided the preliminary 
injunction against Facebook, Pet. App. 36a; 51a, and 
ordered the trial court to dismiss all claims against 
Facebook with prejudice, Pet. App. 36a; 51a. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama then denied 
rehearing, Pet. App. 60a–61a and upon remand, the 
Circuit Court of Jefferson County dismissed with 
prejudice all the claims against Facebook, Pet. App. 
53a–54a. This petition followed. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
 This case presents a recurring question of 
nationwide importance on an issue expressly left open 
by this Court in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014).  
There, this Court—in response to arguments about 
unfairness that might arise from declining to find 
minimum contacts in the context of intentional torts 
“committed via the Internet or other electronic 
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means,” noted that Walden did “not present the very 
different questions whether and how a defendant’s 
virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ 
with a particular State.” Id. at 290 n.9. Walden thus 
expressly left questions about virtual contacts “for 
another day.” Id. That day has arrived.   
Since International Shoe, this Court’s teachings 
have recognized that the types of contacts that satisfy 
due process must evolve and adapt as technology 
advances. And as virtual contacts have expanded, so 
too have the opportunities for a defendant to reach into 
a state and cause harm without any physical presence.  
While the Information Age has transformed the ways 
that Americans do business and communicate with 
one another, this Court has yet to address the 
jurisdictional ramifications of that transformation.  
In particular, in the absence of clear guidance 
from this Court, courts have struggled with what it 
means to “target[] the forum” in a world where conduct 
happens everywhere at once, but nowhere in 
particular. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S. 873, 890 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by 
Alito, J.). 
Before Walden was decided, a fragile consensus 
had developed in the lower courts that intentionally 
tortious or infringing online content about a forum 
state and causing known harm within that state 
conferred jurisdiction, even if the publication was 
universally available online and not—other than its 
content—targeted at the forum state in any particular 
sense. That consensus reflected a straightforward 
application of this Court’s print-media decision in 
Calder to electronic-media defamation and similar 
torts.  
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But after Walden, this consensus is eroding. In 
cases involving intentional misconduct carried out 
online, courts face a host of challenges in 
disentangling a defendant’s contacts with a plaintiff 
alone (which are not sufficient) from a defendant’s 
contact with the forum state (which are).   
The wrong turns made by the Alabama Supreme 
Court here exemplify the disarray in the lower courts. 
Here, while acknowledging Facebook’s broad virtual 
reach, Alabama’s highest court gave that online 
accessibility zero weight in its specific jurisdiction 
analysis. Other courts, in contrast, have recognized 
that broad accessibility can actually support, not 
negate, a finding that a defendant purposefully 
targeted its (virtual) conduct toward a particular 
forum state. Those courts recognize that when a 
publication is globally accessible, its content alone can 
supply the necessary purposeful contacts with the 
forum state.   
The Alabama Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
flatly rejected the proposition that targeted content on 
a globally-available website can be enough. That was 
wrong: Facebook’s refusal to remove a page that was 
expressly aimed at Alabama—through its focus on an 
Alabama adoption, critique of Alabama law, 
showcasing of Alabama residents, and reputational 
harm in Alabama from Alabama Facebook users who 
read and commented on the page—was a 
jurisdictionally significant contact with the forum, 
even though the page was also viewable everywhere in 
the world.   
This case also illustrates the need for clear rules. 
However this Court resolves the question, everyone 
involved—courts across the country, individuals 
14 
 
harmed by tortious or infringing online content, and 
the millions of individuals and businesses who engage 
in activity online every day and might find themselves 
subject to suit—need to understand where the 
boundaries of state authority lie. Does the expansive 
reach of virtual conduct provide a get-out-of-
jurisdiction-free card because conduct that 
simultaneously occurs everywhere by definition is not 
targeted anywhere? Or should a defendant be subject 
to jurisdiction where it knowingly focuses the content 
of a tortious online publication on a particular state, 
even though the publication is simultaneously 
available everywhere and it makes no other particular 
effort to garner greater readership in that state than 
any other? 
As Facebook’s Chairman and CEO recognized 
before the Senate in recent testimony, the internet can 
be used to “give people a voice” but also to “hurt people 
or spread misinformation.”4 Where it is alleged that 
Facebook knowingly allowed its platform to spread a 
harmful and unlawful page—with knowledge that the 
page focused on a particular state, criticized  and 
violated that state’s laws, and caused harm in that 
state—it is critical that plaintiffs, states, and 
defendants alike know with certainty whether a court 
in that state can, consistent with due process, 
adjudicate that claim. This Court’s intervention is 
 
4 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse 
of Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 115th Cong. 1 
(2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO, 
Facebook), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-
10-18%20Zuckerberg%20Testimony.pdf. 
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needed to answer Walden’s open question and provide 
that clarity.  
I. The Decision Below Presents An Important 
And Far-Reaching Question Of Federal Law 
Left Open By This Court. 
This Court has long recognized that the 
jurisdictional inquiry is neither “mechanical [n]or 
quantitative.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 319 (1945). “Whether due process is satisfied 
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the 
activity in relation to the fair and orderly 
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of 
the due process clause to insure.” Id. This qualitative 
assessment of whether due process permits the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction focuses upon “the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 
(1977); see also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 
U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality opinion) (International 
Shoe “cast ... aside” fictions of “consent” and 
“presence”). 
Changes in technology have long been part and 
parcel of this evolution towards relinquishing 
formalistic rules in favor of a more qualitative inquiry.  
More than half a century ago, this Court recognized 
that gains in “technological progress” can lead to a 
“similar increase” in the “need for jurisdiction over 
nonresidents”; that “progress in communication and 
transportation” has reduced the burden of defending a 
suit in a foreign tribunal; and that these trends 
explained the jettisoning of the rigid requirements of 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in favor of  
International Shoe’s more flexible approach. Hansen v. 
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Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958). Technological 
advances have thus, for decades, altered the stakes for 
personal jurisdiction by enhancing state interests in 
reaching the conduct of nonresident defendants and 
minimizing burdens for those haled into court outside 
of their “home” state. See Julie Cromer Young, The 
Online-Contacts Gamble After Walden v. Fiore, 19 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753, 754 (2015) (hereinafter 
Young, Online-Contacts Gamble). 
But this Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence has yet to join the Internet age, even as 
Justices have questioned how standards like 
“targeting the forum” can be applied given today’s 
interconnected economy. See Nicastro, 564 U.S  at 890 
(Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.); see also id. 
(“But what do those standards mean when a company 
targets the world by selling products from its Web 
site?”). 
In the absence of clear guidance from this Court, 
lower courts have plunged ahead, with some 
recognizing the modern reality that targeting a 
nationwide market can, at least in some 
circumstances, constitute targeting any particular 
state within that market and others, like the Alabama 
Supreme Court here, hewing to a more hidebound 
mode of analysis. See infra pp. 26–29. Lower courts 
have noted the Court’s failure to “reconceive[] and 
rearticulate[]” “the due process concepts of personal 
jurisdiction … in light of advances in technology.” ALS 
Scan, Inc. v. Dig. Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 
713 (4th Cir. 2002). Laments are frequent “that this is 
an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet had 
the occasion to give clear guidance[.]” Plixer Int’l, Inc. 
v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2018).  
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The time for that guidance has arrived. There can 
be no doubt that “[u]se of the internet for commercial 
ventures has steadily and exponentially grown since 
1995, when the internet was untethered from a single 
National Science Foundation backbone.” Young, 
Online-Contacts Gamble, at 754 & n.4. And, 
increasingly, virtual contacts are what connect us, as 
any observer of teenagers well knows. In the U.S., 
“adults spend more than 6 hours per day on digital 
media.” Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social 
Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/s3urrcn. Today, roughly seven in 
ten adults in the United States use Facebook. See John 
Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 16, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/y4apu58j. 
Virtual exchanges provide an ever-more-
attractive option for personal and business 
interactions in the United States. And just as 
constitutional limits to the reach of other state powers 
reflect technological advances, so too should due 
process constraints on the exercises of a state’s 
adjudicatory authority. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2097 
(“[I]t [is] manifest that the physical presence rule as 
defined by Quill must give way to the ‘far-reaching 
systemic and structural changes in the economy’ and 
‘many other societal dimensions’ caused by the Cyber 
Age.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Allen 
Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local 
Effects of Intentional Misconduct, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 385, 424–26 (2015) (hereinafter Erbsen, Local 
Effects) (discussing similarities in evolution of due 
process limits on personal jurisdiction and state taxing 
power).   
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Despite the ever-growing swath of interactions 
taking place online rather than in person—and the 
inevitable ever-growing stream of controversies 
generated by the virtual contacts that now permeate 
our lives—this Court has yet to resolve how to assess 
virtual conduct or presence for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction analysis—i.e., when and how virtual 
presence can be considered an “activity or an 
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
919 (2011) (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).   
On the contrary, in Walden, the Court left for 
“another day” the “questions whether and how a 
defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate 
into ‘contacts’ with a particular State,”  because there 
was “no question where the conduct ... took place,” in 
that case. 571 U.S. at 290 n.9. And in Nicastro, 564 
U.S. at 887, Justice Breyer (writing for himself and 
Justice Alito) cautioned against “announce[ment of] a 
rule of broad applicability without full consideration of 
the modern-day consequences” because that case did 
not present any of those issues. Id.  
The five years since Walden have not improved 
the situation. As scholars have observed, and a 
panoply of cases demonstrate, “American courts are 
still virtually without guidance, left to determine for 
themselves the extent of Walden’s application to 
contacts that remain primarily online.” Young, Online-
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Contacts Gamble at 755; see also Erbsen, Local Effects 
at 415–16.5  
In particular, the lack of guidance regarding the 
relevance of the effects of an intentional tortfeasor’s 
conduct in the virtual realm has presented recurring 
problems. We call it the Information Age for a reason. 
And it is the information-based torts (copyright 
infringement, trademark infringement, defamation, 
invasion of privacy, unlawful disclosure, and so on) 
that have increasingly moved entirely online. The 
connections between the defendant’s conduct, a 
defamatory article’s content, the harmful effects on 
the plaintiff, and the forum state are relatively easy to 
articulate when a publisher physically circulates 
copies of a defamatory article within a state. See 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In those 
circumstances, courts can comfortably say that “the 
‘effects’ caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the 
injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of 
the California public—connected the defendants’ 
conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived 
there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 288.  
But what happens when a defendant can achieve 
precisely the same effects—harm to reputation in the 
 
5  A search for post-Walden cases addressing specific 
jurisdiction in the context of virtual contacts yielded, by 
conservative estimate, scores of decisions from the federal courts 
of appeals, state courts of last resort, and federal district courts.  
That so many cases have been generated since Walden was 
decided in 2014, but with no guidance from the Court for how to 
handle precisely the question that Walden left open, is strong 
reason to grant this petition. All the more so because Walden 
introduced more division into the lower courts regarding how to 
handle the issue, as detailed in Part II. 
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forum state—at the click of a button, merely by posting 
something simultaneously to the entire world? Then, 
can a court find that the harmful effects are the result 
of the defendant’s conduct toward (or “in”) the forum 
state? Or is the reputational injury merely connected 
to a plaintiff who lives there? The formal distinction 
between a defendant’s contacts “with the forum State 
itself” and its contacts “with persons who reside 
there,” Id. at 285—a distinction that drove Walden’s 
jurisdictional analysis—blurs when all the contacts 
are electronic.   
Walden expressly refused to address these issues 
because that case did not involve virtual conduct or 
presence. This Court’s guidance is needed to answer 
the important question flagged in Nicastro and 
expressly left open in Walden, and to clarify that a 
defendant’s virtual presence and conduct can sustain 
a state’s authority to assert specific jurisdiction where, 
as here, the brunt of the injury is felt in the forum 
state and the substance of the alleged misconduct, as 
here, is centered around that forum. 
II. This Case Presents A Recurring Question 
Which Has Confused And Divided The 
Lower Courts. 
Jurisdiction is fairly clear in cases involving old 
media—the physical circulation of newspapers and 
magazines. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 
U.S. 770, 773–74 (1984) (finding a publisher’s “regular 
circulation of magazines in the forum State is 
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a 
libel action based on the contents of the magazine”). 
When a complaint involves the publication or 
dissemination of allegedly tortious or infringing 
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material on a website, however—even, or especially, 
one with millions of subscribers and a vast user base 
in every state—courts of appeals and state courts of 
last resort have struggled in the absence of clear 
guidance from this Court.  
Courts are virtually unanimous that the mere 
accessibility in a state of a passive website that 
displays information not targeted to a particular state 
is not alone enough for specific jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Plixer Int’l, 905 F.3d at 8 (collecting cases); ALS Scan, 
293 F.3d at 714 (“[A] person who simply places 
information on the Internet does not subject himself to 
jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic 
signal is transmitted and received.”). Beyond that 
guidepost, however, a significant divide has emerged 
in the years following Walden.  
A. Pre-Walden, a Fragile Consensus Held 
that Virtual Contacts Could Establish 
Specific Jurisdiction for Intentional 
Torts Involving Globally-Accessible, 
Forum-Focused Online Content.  
Before Walden, the courts of appeals and state 
courts of last resort that considered the question 
appeared to accept that where an intentional tort was 
committed by means of a universally-accessible 
website, the online activity constituted minimum 
contacts with the forum state if the tortious or 
infringing page focused on the state or the plaintiff’s 
in-state activities, or the defendant knew that the 
brunt of the harm would be suffered in the forum state, 
or some combination of these factors.  
In the most jurisdiction-friendly camp, the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits rested jurisdiction solely on the 
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tortfeasor’s intentional targeting of a particular 
plaintiff through a website accessible in the forum 
state, with knowledge that the plaintiff would suffer 
harm within that state. See, e.g., Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. 
Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(describing circuit law that “operating even a passive 
website in conjunction with ‘something more’” can 
confer jurisdiction, and “something more” can turn on 
“whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a 
plaintiff known to be a forum resident”) (internal 
citations omitted); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 
1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding jurisdiction based 
on website’s infringement of copyrighted photo of 
Florida musician because the infringement was “an 
intentional tort, expressly aimed at a specific 
individual in the forum whose effects were suffered in 
the forum”). 
Other courts required some additional contact 
beyond knowledge (and intent) that harm would be 
suffered in the forum state. For example, the Tenth 
Circuit held in Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 
1244 (10th Cir. 2011), that “defamatory postings may 
give rise to personal jurisdiction if they … make the 
forum state the focal point of the message.” Id. at 
1244–45 (finding no jurisdiction where the forum state 
“was not the focal point of the email … either in terms 
of its audience or its content”); accord Silver v. Brown, 
382 F. App’x 723, 729–30 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding 
jurisdiction could be exercised in New Mexico where a 
blog “was about a New Mexico resident and a New 
Mexico company,” complained about “actions [that] 
occurred mainly in New Mexico,” “the blog was widely 
available in New Mexico over the internet,” and the 
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defendant “had knowledge that the brunt of the injury 
to [the plaintiff] would be felt in New Mexico”). 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit held that 
jurisdiction was proper in Illinois where defendants 
used websites to defame an Illinois business, knowing 
that the plaintiff operated the business in Illinois and 
would be harmed there, listed his Illinois address, and 
urged readers to contact him there to complain. 
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 697–98 (7th Cir. 
2010). But for a defendant that did nothing other than 
repost some defamatory messages, without either 
mentioning Illinois or knowing that the plaintiff’s 
business operated there, jurisdiction did not lie. Id. at 
698–99. Some state courts of last resort followed the 
same rule. See, e.g., Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. 
Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 795–96 (Ohio 2010) (holding 
minimum contacts satisfied where the defendant 
made defamatory statements online about the 
plaintiff’s Ohio activities, harming plaintiff’s 
reputation centered in Ohio, and there was evidence 
that at least five Ohioans read the postings). 
Courts that rejected personal jurisdiction over 
virtual, intentional torts pre-Walden did not generally 
reject the content-plus-brunt-of-harm framework. 
Instead, they found jurisdiction impermissible where 
the allegedly tortious online content did not focus on 
the forum state, and therefore the only connection 
between the forum state and the tort was the 
happenstance of the plaintiff’s residence, sometimes 
unknown to the alleged tortfeasor.  
For example, in Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th 
Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit rejected Texas jurisdiction 
over a suit against the Massachusetts author of an 
allegedly defamatory article and the New York 
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provider of the online forum where the article was 
posted. Id. at 473. The court held that there was no 
specific jurisdiction in Texas because the article 
“contains no reference to Texas, nor does it refer to the 
Texas activities of” the plaintiff. Id. It did not draw on 
Texas sources and there was no indication that the 
article found a particular audience in Texas. Id. 
Indeed, the “[author] was apparently unaware that 
[the plaintiff] then resided in Texas.” Id. at 469; accord 
Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 679 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (holding no jurisdiction in Ohio where 
defendant’s website “specifically refers to [the 
plaintiff’s] activities in Massachusetts” and “[n]either 
the site, nor any of its listed articles directly discuss 
[the plaintiff’s] activities in Ohio”); Griffis v. Luban, 
646 N.W.2d 527, 535–36 (Minn. 2002) (holding 
Alabama court lacked jurisdiction over a defamation 
claim where the online forum was “organized around 
the subjects of archeology and Egyptology, not 
Alabama or the University of Alabama academic 
community” and there was no evidence that anyone 
other than the plaintiff read the postings in Alabama). 
There is some variation in results based on 
courts’ differing assessments of whether location was 
central or incidental to the content of the tortfeasor’s 
postings. Compare Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 697 (finding 
jurisdiction where defamatory web posting listed 
plaintiff’s Illinois address), with Johnson v. Arden, 614 
F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that even 
though an allegedly defamatory posting twice 
referenced the location of a business, and the plaintiffs 
suffered reputation harm there, “the  inclusion of 
‘Missouri’ in the posting was incidental and not 
‘performed for the very purpose of having … 
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consequences’ felt in Missouri” and therefore 
jurisdiction was not consistent with due process); see 
also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding Virginia lacked jurisdiction 
over defamation claim for articles published by 
Connecticut newspapers online that mentioned a 
Virginia warden’s treatment of Connecticut prisoners 
where the “focus of the articles … was the Connecticut 
prisoner transfer policy and its impact … in 
Connecticut”). But the fragile consensus pre-Walden 
was that an intentionally tortious or infringing online 
publication focused on activities within a forum state 
and causing known harm within that state conferred 
jurisdiction, even if the publication was universally 
available online.  
B. Walden Introduced Confusion and 
Eroded the Emerging Consensus.  
Properly understood—especially given its 
express reservation of the “virtual contacts” question, 
571 U.S. at 290 n.9—this Court’s decision in Walden 
should not have disturbed this emerging consensus. 
Unfortunately, however, some courts have taken an 
expansive view of Walden’s scope, creating a new 
divide in authority and effectively rendering Calder 
inapplicable in the modern era. So even though 
Walden disclaimed any intent to address virtual 
contacts, its requirement that the defendant’s ties be 
with the forum—not only the plaintiff—created 
division and confusion in the lower courts for virtual 
misconduct cases.  
Those courts of appeals that had adopted a 
general rule permitting targeted harm to a known 
forum resident alone to satisfy due process for any 
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intentional tort—physical or virtual—properly 
recognized that Walden foreclosed such a blanket rule. 
See, e.g., Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 
F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Following Walden, 
we now hold that while a theory of individualized 
targeting may remain relevant to the minimum 
contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction.”); Advanced Tactical 
Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 
F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Any decision that 
implies” a plaintiff can “be the only link between the 
defendant and the forum” “can no longer be considered 
authoritative” after Walden). 
That is where the consensus ends. Some courts, 
such as the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, have 
recognized that in a virtual contacts case, the website 
accessible in the forum state is itself a relevant 
contact—even if the site is available nationwide, and 
especially if it has an acknowledged user base in the 
state. Those circuits hold that the website, combined 
with known and foreseeable harm within the forum, is 
enough without some greater evidence of forum-state 
targeting. See, e.g., Plixer Int’l, 905 F.3d at 8–9 
(holding that serving U.S. market through an 
interactive website that accepted U.S. users and did 
not block web traffic from the U.S. was sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction over a trademark infringement suit 
against a German defendant even though the company 
targeted a global market without specific targeting of 
the U.S. market); EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. 
MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(approving specific jurisdiction in New York over 
largely free online music storage service because the 
executive was aware that the site had 400 users in 
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New York even though the website “served a national 
market, as opposed to a New York-specific market”); 
Alpha Phoenix Indus., LLC v. SCI Int’l, Inc., 666 F. 
App’x 598, 600 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding defendants 
purposefully reached “into Arizona by posting 
allegedly defamatory statements about” an Arizona 
business with “intent to affect Plaintiff's business, 
which is based and operates in Arizona”) (citing 
Walden, 571 U.S. at 285). 
Consistent with this view, many state courts of 
last resort have continued to espouse the rule that 
online publication of content about the forum state or 
the plaintiff’s forum-state activities satisfies minimum 
contacts for due process, even if the website is widely 
available. See, e.g., Harper v. BioLife Energy Sys., Inc., 
426 P.3d 1067, 1075 (Alaska 2018) (holding online 
brochure did not create minimum contacts with 
Alaska because no “Alaska resident ever actually 
viewed the brochure online,” it did not draw “on 
Alaska sources,” and the author did not know “of any 
connection its brochure would have to Alaska”); TV 
Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 47 (Tex. 2016) 
(affirming “subject-and-sources test” but finding 
jurisdiction on other grounds). 
Other courts, including the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits, have issued decisions that effectively 
disregard any web activity that is nationwide in scope 
unless there is some evidence of targeted advertising 
of the website, or similar activity, in the forum state. 
In Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 
895 (10th Cir. 2017), for example, the Tenth Circuit 
rejected Colorado jurisdiction over a claim arising out 
of a subscriber’s use in Colorado of allegedly defective 
maintenance manuals received through an online 
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subscription. Id. at 900–01. Among other reasons, the 
Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had not proved 
the defendant advertised its manual-subscription 
program to Colorado, specifically (as opposed to 
nationally) and the manual subscriptions were equally 
available nationwide. Id. at 916–17. Similarly, the 
Seventh Circuit held that an interactive website 
available in Indiana that posted allegedly trademark-
infringing material, coupled with infringing emails to 
lists that included Indiana customers and knowledge 
of the harm the infringement would cause in Indiana 
was not enough, without more, to satisfy due process. 
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d at 
801. Because the defendant’s interactive website was 
available nationwide, the Court concluded it evidenced 
no intent to target the Indiana market, but noted that 
“geographically-restricted online ads” might suffice to 
show targeting. Id. at 803. 
The Alabama Supreme Court followed the latter 
model here, relying in part on the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision, Pet. App. 27a n.11, and rejecting the 
decisions of other courts of appeals as swept away by 
Walden, Pet. App. 33a & n.12. Disregarding 
Facebook’s Alabama user base, Pet. App. 27a n.11, and 
failing to recognize that the content of a page that 
“wholly pertained to an Alabama adoption,” Pet. App. 
26a, is itself a relevant contact, the Alabama Supreme 
Court reached a result that cannot be reconciled with 
the decisions described above that, even after Walden, 
continue to recognize that forum-state subject and 
sources are a relevant (and sufficient) contact 
satisfying due process. 
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III. The Alabama Supreme Court Erred By Its 
Overly Expansive Application Of Walden To 
Virtual Contacts, A Question That Walden 
Expressly Left Open. 
Under a straightforward application of Calder, 
this case should have come out differently. The page 
that Facebook refused to take down, and continued to 
disseminate, was entirely about an Alabama adoption. 
Every key element described on the page was 
connected to Alabama: the birth mother, the adoptive 
mother, Baby Doe, the procedures followed and 
decisions issued by Alabama courts, and a purportedly 
unique (and much-criticized) aspect of Alabama law 
permitting pre-birth consent to adoption (described by 
the page as illegal in 48 states). Pet. App. 5a–6a; id. at 
50a & n.18; id. at 71a (FAC ¶¶ 20–21); FAC, Exhibit 
A, at 5, Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, at 336. The videos on 
the page were taken in Alabama. Pet. App. 72a (FAC 
¶ 25). Facebook disseminated the page widely in 
Alabama: it has users there, Pet. App. 9a; K.G.S.’s 
friends, family, and business associates saw the page, 
Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32); and K.G.S. received “hateful 
messages” in response to the page from numerous 
Alabama residents and organizations, Pet. App. 73a 
(FAC ¶ 30), including one that she should be “drug 
through the streets of Birmingham,” Record on 
Appeal, Vol. 2, at 309. Facebook was given notice, 
moreover, that the information on the page was 
confidential under Alabama law and that its 
dissemination of the page was causing harm to K.G.S. 
in Alabama. Pet. App. 11a. 
Put another way, the “story concerned the 
[Alabama] activities of a [Alabama] resident,” the 
story centered on Alabama adoption laws and 
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procedures, the page “was drawn from [Alabama] 
sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of 
[the plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to 
her … reputation, was suffered in [Alabama]. In sum, 
[Alabama] is the focal point both of the [page] and of 
the harm suffered.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.   
True, Facebook did not write the page. But it did 
review the page for compliance with its Community 
Standards, approved the page as compliant (reversing 
an initial decision), declined to remove the page, and 
continued to disseminate it using the Facebook 
platform, Pet. App. 6a—even after being given notice 
that the page did not comply with Alabama law and 
was causing harm in Alabama. Cf. Calder, 465 U.S. at 
786 (holding California had personal jurisdiction over 
Florida editor who approved the subject of an article, 
edited it, and declined to print a retraction).  
In Walden, the Court stressed that “the ‘effects’ 
caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to 
the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of the 
California public—connected the defendants’ conduct 
to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there.” 
571 U.S. at 288. So, too here. The injury and emotional 
distress caused by disclosure of information kept 
confidential under Alabama law depends upon its 
disclosure to readers in Alabama, such as K.G.S.’s 
friends, neighbors, and business associates who 
viewed her in a different light after reading the page, 
Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 32), just as the defamation tort 
in Calder depended upon reputational injury in 
California from the article’s dissemination there, 
Walden, 571 U.S. at 287–88. True, the magazine at 
issue in Calder physically entered California and was 
circulated in print to approximately 600,000 
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Californians. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. And given the 
nature of modern media, the page at issue here did not 
physically travel anywhere. But it was circulated 
virtually within Alabama, likely to a large number of 
Facebook’s undisputed users within the state, Pet. 
App. 9a, many of which sent “hateful messages” to 
K.G.S. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶¶ 30–31).  
The Alabama Supreme Court was thus wrong to 
woodenly conclude that contacts between Petitioner’s 
attorney and Facebook were the only suit-related 
connection between Facebook and Alabama; and could 
be disregarded because they were not initiated by 
Facebook. Pet. App. 32a, 34a. Perhaps because Walden 
failed to address virtual contacts, the Alabama 
Supreme Court failed to consider the jurisdictional 
import of the page itself—which Facebook reviewed 
and made the decision to continue to disseminate. 
Petitioner is not arguing that jurisdiction lies in 
Alabama solely because of the happenstance of 
Petitioner’s residence there—an avenue that Walden 
concededly forecloses. Petitioner is arguing that 
continued dissemination of a page all about 
Alabama—fed by Alabama sources and read and 
commented on by Alabama residents—with 
knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be 
suffered in Alabama, creates sufficient contacts to 
satisfy due process.  
It is not as if the page addressed Petitioner’s 
activities in another state—or even activities that 
occurred in Alabama but for which the Alabama 
location was irrelevant. See Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796 
(finding insufficient contacts with Missouri where any 
mentions of the state were “incidental” to allegedly 
defamatory web posts). Rather, the page attacked 
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Petitioner’s adoption of Baby Doe precisely because it 
occurred in Alabama, purportedly one of only two 
states to permit pre-birth consent to adoption. 
Moreover, one of the harms alleged was uniquely 
Alabamian, resulting from disclosure of information 
that Alabama protects as confidential. The location in 
Alabama is as central (if not more so) to the page that 
Facebook reviewed, refused to take down, and 
wrongfully continued to disseminate as the 
entertainment industry’s California locus was to the 
tort at issue in Calder. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.  
When the page’s subject matter is properly 
considered, it becomes difficult to understand the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that Facebook’s 
failure to remove the page was “intentional conduct … 
expressly aimed at K.G.S. herself and not at Alabama 
as a forum.” Pet. App. 35a. Although the harm was 
suffered by K.G.S., the conduct of continuing to 
disseminate the page, given its subject matter, was at 
the very least aimed at Alabama readers as well as 
K.G.S. herself.  
The Court’s reasoning falls even wider of the 
mark in its refusal to consider Facebook’s availability 
in Alabama. Pet. App. 27a n.11. First, Facebook is not 
merely “accessible” in Alabama; it has a base of users 
there who sign up for its service and are accepted (or 
not) by Facebook. Pet. App. 9a. Second, even if mere 
accessibility is not alone enough to satisfy minimum 
contacts—a point no one disputes—that does not make 
the availability of Facebook to Alabama readers 
wholly irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry, any 
more than “mere” availability on newsstands 
nationwide would make the circulation of an Alabama-
focused article within Alabama irrelevant if this case 
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involved paper-based media. And, in any event, the 
complaint did not allege that the page was merely 
available to Alabama residents; it alleged that many 
of them read it and sent K.G.S. hateful messages in 
response. Pet. App. 73a (FAC ¶ 30).  
Ultimately, and “[i]n contrast to general, all-
purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to 
adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected 
with, the very controversy that establishes 
jurisdiction.’” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 
U.S. at 919 (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald 
T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)). Here, 
the Alabama-focused page lies at the very core of the 
controversy, and this Court should clarify that under 
such circumstances, jurisdiction is proper, even when 
the page was also available everywhere in the world.   
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted.  
Respectfully submitted. 
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